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NETWORK NEUTRALITY, BROADBAND
DISCRIMINATION
0

TIMWU

INTRODUCTION

Communications regulators over the next decade will spend
increasing time on conflicts between the private interests of broadband
providers and the public's interest in a competitive innovation
environment centered on the Internet. As the policy questions this
conflict raises are basic to communications policy, they are likely to
reappear in many different forms. So far, the first major appearance has
come in the "open access" (or "multiple access") debate, over the
desirability of allowing vertical integration between Internet Service
Providers and cable operators. 1 Proponents of open access see it as a
structural remedy to guard against an erosion of the "neutrality'' of the
network as between competing content and applications. Critics,
meanwhile, have taken open-access regulation as unnecessary and likely
to slow the pace of broadband deployment.
This paper takes a more general perspective. The questions raised
in discussions of open access and network neutrality are basic to both

· Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School. I am grateful for
comments on this paper from Tom Nachbar, Lawrence Lessig, Mark Lemley, Glen Robinson
along with participants at the 2003 Silicon Flatirons Conference and the 2003 University of
Ottawa Tory Law Speaker Series. The ideas in this paper were aided by discussions of
network neutrality questions with individuals at the Federal Communications Commission
and Congress, including Jordan Goldstein, James Assey, Jessica Rosenworcel and
Commissioner Michael Copps.
l. See generallyJoseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the lntemet
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2003), available at http://repositories.
cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-035 (last visited Sept. 24, 2003); Glenn A. Woroch, Open Access
Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 719 (2002); Glen 0.
Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1224-27 (2002);
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End ofEnd-to-End· Preserving the Architecture of
the Intemet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Phil Weiser, Paradigm
Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 819 (2000); James B.
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of Open Access Rules for
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE.J. ON REG. 39, 77-90 (2000).
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telecommunications and innovation policy. The promotion of network
neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair
evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a
telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government
regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the shortterm interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or
applications becoming available to end-users.
The same interest
animates the promotion of network neutrality: preserving a Darwinian
competition among every conceivable use of the Internet so that the only
the best survive .
. Given the likely recurrence of these kinds of questions, this paper
compares three general approaches to the regulation of broadband
providers: structural remedies, a non-discrimination regime, and self- or
non-regulation. It questions, first, the merits of structural remedies like
open access as a means for promoting network innovation in favor of less
intrusive models. While structural restrictions like open access may serve
other interests, as a remedy to promote the neutrality of the network they
are potentially counterproductive. Proponents of open access have
generally overlooked the fact that, to the extent an open access rule
inhibits vertical relationships, it can help maintain the Internet's greatest
deviation from network neutrality. That deviation is favoritism of data
applications, as a class, over latency-sensitive applications involving voice
or video. There is also reason to believe that open access alone can be an
insufficient remedy for many of the likely instances of network
discrimination.
The preferable framework for ensuring network neutrality, I argue,
forgoes structural remedies for a direct scrutiny of broadband
discrimination. The link between anti-discrimination regulations and
network innovation are as old as the Hush-a-Phont?- and Carterfone'
decisions, which controlled AT&T's efforts to destroy innovative
network attachments. The basic principle behind a network antidiscrimination regime is to give users the right to use non-harmful
network attachments or applications, and give innovators the
corresponding freedom to supply them. Such a regime avoids some of
the costs of structural regulation by allowing for efficient vertical
integration so long as the rights granted to the users of the network are
not compromised.
But might network neutrality be accomplished without any
regulation at all? Basic economic theory suggests that operators have a
long-term interest coincident with the public: both should want a neutral
platform that supports the emergence of the very best applications.
2.
3.

Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Use ofthe Carter/one Device in Message Toll Tel Serv., 31 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
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However the evidence suggests the operators may have paid less
attention to their long-term interests than might be ideal. A 2002 survey
of operator practices conducted for this paper suggests a tendency to
favor short-term results. 4 In that year, evidence of a discrimination
problem became clear from several sources, including consumer
complaints about operators who ban classes of applications or equipment,
like servers, Virtual Private Networks, or WiFi devices,5 and in filings at
the Federal Communications Commission by application developers. 6
The survey in this paper shows that operators indeed had implemented
significant contractual and architectural limits on certain classes of
applications. Operators showed an unfortunate tendency to want to ban
new or emerging applications or network attachments, like WiFi devices
or Virtual Private Networks, perhaps out of suspicion or an (often futile)
interest in price-discrimination. On the whole the evidence suggests that
the operators were often pursuing legitimate goals, such as price
discrimination and bandwidth management. The problem was the use of
methods, like bans on certain forms of applications, which are likely to
distort the market and the future of application development. In short,
the recent historical record gives good reason to question the efficacy of
self-regulation in this area.
I don't want to suggest that operators are somehow incapable of
understanding their long-term interests. Yet, when we return to the
open access debate, one account of the utility of the debate is that it
played an important informational role-the debate itself helped cable
operators evaluate their long-term self-interests, and many have chosen
to allow rival ISPs access to their networks, for a variety of reasons. 7
Even strong believers in deregulation and the advantages of vertical
integration recognize that incumbents may occasionally become set in
their ways. 8 In this respect, one of the functions of raising issues of
broadband discrimination is to challenge broadband operators to ask
whether applications restrictions are a good long-term policy. Indeed
many of the improvements in operator behavior in the year 2003 may be

4. See infra Appendix.
5. Complaints about restrictions on broadband applications like filesharing applications
or VPNs are common on discussion forums like DSL Reports. See, e.g., BROADBAND
REPORTS, at http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,3775421;mode=flat;root=sware Ouly,
2002).
6. See Comments of the High Tech Broadband Coalition, In re: Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities (filed June 18, 2002),
available at http://www.itic.org/policy/fcc_020618.pdf; see also FCC Ex Parte Letter, Aug. 22
2003, available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf.
7. For example, AT&T Broadband has recently begun to open parts of its network to
ISP competition. See Peter J. Howe, Earthlink Debuts On AT&T Networks Offers HighSpeed Internet Semce, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2002, at C4.
8. See, e.g., Farrell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 33-36.
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linked to the Federal Communications Commission's increased oversight
of this area.
This paper encompasses a mixture · of empirical and theoretical
sections. The first part of five is an effort to explain the relationship
between several related concepts in this area: open access, broadband
discrimination, and network neutrality.
Network neutrality, as
shorthand for a system of belief about innovation policy, is the end, while
open access and broadband discrimination are the means. I suggest that
open access regulation, as a structural remedy to ensure network
neutrality, is not ideally suited to that task. A direct analysis premised on
normative principle of network neutrality may provide a better means to
discuss the harm in question.
The second part develops the theoretical framework for a broadband
discrimination regime. It asks whether we can differentiate between
justified and unjustified restrictions on user behavior, with particular
reference to the restrictions seen in the survey in the third part. The use
of restrictions on classes of application to pursue bandwidth management
and price discrimination is troubling when those restrictions might be
pursued through less restrictive means. The section also asks whether
self-regulation is likely, and concludes that the threat of regulation might
serve useful.
The third part is a survey of the degree to which broadband
operators restrict certain applications and favor others. The study surveys
the nation's 10 largest cable operators and six largest DSL providers.
The results are mixed. First, cable operators tend to employ far more
contractual restrictions than do DSL operators.
The contractual
restrictions and network designs tend to favor, as a class, one-to-many
applications development. Second, there is a tendency to use restrictions
on application classes to pursue goals such as price discrimination and
bandwidth management.
The fourth part shows what a workable principle of network
neutrality would look like and what it would mean for the conduct of
broadband providers. It suggests that operators should have the freedom
to "police what they own," or act reasonably to control the local
broadband network. · On the other hand, it suggests that that the
Internet community (and, at some point, regulators) should view with
suspicion restrictions premised on inter-network criteria. A sample text
of an anti-discrimination law is included to show how such a principle
could be implemented. Finally, the fifth and final part of this paper
addresses several possible counterarguments to the network neutrality
regime discussed in this article.
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I. NETWORK NEUTRALI1Y & OPEN ACCESS
The relationship between concepts like open-access, network
neutrality, and broadband discrimination may be unclear to the reader.
It is best to understand network neutrality as an end, and open access and
broadband discrimination as different means to that end. In this section
we will examine both why network neutrality might be an attractive goal,
and, how an open-access and broadband discrimination regime differ as
means toward that end.

A. The Case for Network Neutrality
So what is attractive about a neutral network--that is, an Internet
that does not favor one application (say, the world wide web), over others
(say, email)? Who cares if the Internet is better for some things than
others?9
The argument for network neutrality must be understood as a
concrete expression of a system of belief about innovation, one that has
gained significant popularity over last two decades. The belief system
goes by many names. 10 Here we can refer to it generally as the
evolutionary model. 11 Speaking very generally, adherents view the
innovation process as a survival-of-the-fittest competition among
developers of new technologies. They are suspicious of models of
development that might vest control in any initial prospect-holder,
private or public, who is expected to direct the optimal path of
innovation, minimizing the excesses of innovative competition. 12 The
suspicion arises from the belief that the most promising path of
development is difficult to predict in advance, and the argument that any
single prospect holder will suffer from cognitive biases (such as a
predisposition to continue with current ways of doing business) that
make it unlikely to come to the right decisions, despite best intentions.

9. More general arguments in favor of a network neutrality regime can be found in
Lawrence Lessig & Tim Wu, FCC Ex Parte Letter, Aug. 22, 2003, available at
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc. pdf.
10. A full treatment of the names given to evolutionary theories of innovation is beyond
the scope of this paper. Some adherents would ascribe such theories to economist Joseph
Schumpeter, while in recent legal work the argument is stated as an argument over what
should be owned and what should be free. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FI.TrURE
OF IDEAS 3-17 (2001).
11. See, e.g., John Ziman, Evolutionary Models for Technological Change, in
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 3 Qohn Ziman ed.,
2000); RICHARD NELSON, UNDERSTANDING TECHNICAL CHANGE AS AN
EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS {1987).
12. In the legal field, Edmund W. K.itch's The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) is often taken to exemplify this approach.
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This account is simplistic; of interest is what the theory says for
network design. A communications network like the Internet can be
seen as a platform for a competition among application developers.
Email, the web, and streaming applications are in a battle for the
attention and interest of end-users. It is therefore important that the
platform be neutral to ensure the competition remains meritocratic.
For these reasons, Internet Darwinians argue that their innovation
theory is embodied in the "end-to-end" design argument, which in
essence suggests that networks should be neutral as among applications. 13
As network theorist Jerome Saltzer puts it: "The End-to-End argument
says 'don't force any service, feature, or restriction on the customer; his
application knows best what features it needs, and whether or not to
provide those features itself.'" 14 The Internet Protocol suite (IP) was
designed to follow the end-to-end principle, and is famously indifferent
both to the physical communications medium "below" it, and the
applications running "above" it. 15 Packets on the Internet run over glass
and copper, ATM and Ethernet, carrying .mp3 files, bits of web pages,
and snippets of chat. Backers of an evolutionary approach to innovation
take the Internet, the , fastest growing communications network in
history, as evidence of the superiority of a network designed along
evolutionary principles. 16 ·
There is much to this debate, and I do not want to suggest that the
discussion about the general merits of evolutionary innovation models are
settled, nor are the debates over whether a neutral platform best
stimulates competition among applications.17 But sentiments like those I
have just expressed have. come to enjoy a broad normative following.
From this we can understand why preserving a neutral network might be
taken as a suitable goal oflnternet communications policy.

13. See J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
TRANSACTIONS COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/
publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
14. Id at 3.
15. The metaphors of "above" and "below" come from the fact that in a layered model of
the Internet's design, the application layers are "above" the TCP/lP layers, while the physical
layers are "below." See ANDREWS. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 39 (4th ed.
2002).
16. LESSIG, supra note .10, at 14 ("No modern phenomenon better demonstrates the
importance of free resources to innovation and creativity than the internet.").
17. For a recent work doubting the merits of open platform designs under some
circumstances, see, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights In Emerging Platform
Technologies, 29]. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000).
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B. The Open Access Remedy and its Limitations
Taking network neutrality as the goal, we can understand open
access as one kind of remedy. The term open-access is used in many
different ways; it generally refers to a structural requirement that would
prevent broadband operators from bundling broadband service with
Internet access from in-house Internet service providers. 18 Certain
proponents, like Jerome Saltzer, Larry Lessig and Mark Lemley, make
the logical link between open-access regulation and the preservation of a
neutral Internet. They argue that if cable operators are allowed to bundle
ISP services with cable services, cable operators would be in a position to
destroy the neutrality of the network by foreclosing competition among
Internet applications. As Lemley and Lessig put it,
[T]here is, in principle, no limit to what a cable company could
bundle into its control of the network. As ISPs expand beyond the
functions they have traditionally performed, AT&T or Time Warner
might be in a position to foreclose all competition in an increasing
range of services provided over broadband lines. The services
available to broadband cable users would then be determined by the
captive ISPs owned by each local cable company. This design would
contradict the principle that the network should remain neutral and
empower users. It further could constitute the first step in a return to
the failed architecture of the old AT&T monopoly. 19

Critics of this argument, like Phil Weiser, Jim Speta, and Glen
Robinson, have, in the main, cast doubt on the claim that regulation is
needed to prevent cable operators from foreclosing competition when it
would be efficient, or ask whether network neutrality is an appropriate
goal. 20 But I want to raise a slightly different question. If we agree with
the normative goal of network neutrality, to what degree does the
structural remedy of open-access actually serve its interest? Might we do
better by targeting network neutrality directly with questions of
broadband discrimination?
I believe there are several reasons to question the fit between openaccess remedies and network neutrality. First, the concept of network
neutrality is not as simple as some IP partisans have suggested.
Neutrality, as a concept, is finicky, and depends entirely on what set of
18. The FCC, for example, has outlined three forms of open access remedy in ongoing
open access rulemaking. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities, Dedaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17
F.C.C.R.. 4798, 1 74 (2002) (discussing various models of open access regulation).
19. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 1, at 942-43.
20. See Speta, supra note 1, at 76; Farrell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 4-6; Robinson,
supra note 1, at 1216-17.
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subjects you choose to be neutral among. 21 A policy that appears neutral
in a certain time period, like "all men may vote", may lose its neutrality in
a later time period, when the range of subjects is enlarged.
This problem afflicts the network neutrality embodied in the IP
protocols. As the universe of applications has grown, the original
conception ofIP neutrality has dated: for IP was only neutral among data
applications. Internet networks tend to favor, as a class, applications
insensitive to latency (delay) or jitter (signal distortion). Consider that it
doesn't matter whether an email arrives now or a few milliseconds later.
But it certainly matters for applications that want to carry voice or video.
In a universe of applications, that includes both latency-sensitive and
insensitive applications, it is difficult to regard the IP suite as truly
neutral as among all applications.
This point is closely linked to questions of structural separation.
The technical reason IP favors data applications is that it lacks any
universal mechanism to offer a quality of service (QgS) guarantee. 22 It
doesn't insist that data arrive at any time or place. Instead, IP generally
adopts a "best-effort" approach: it says, deliver the packets as fast as you
can, which over a typical end-to-end connection may range from a basic
56K connection at the ends, to the precisely timed gigabits of bandwidth
available on backbone SONET links. IP doesn't care: it runs over
everything. But as a consequence, it implicitly disfavors applications that
do care.
Network design is an exercise in tradeoffs, and IP's designers would
point out that the approach of avoiding QgS had important advantages.
Primarily, it helped IP be "downwardly" neutral as to the underlying
physical media. But this requires us to be more circumspect in our
discussions of network neutrality. IP's neutrality is actually a tradeoff
between upward (application) and downward (connection) neutrality. If
it is upward, or application neutrality that consumers care about,
principles of downward neutrality may be a necessary sacrifice.
This returns us to the question of structural separation. We have a
public network that is indeed a great creative commons for data
applications, but it is less so for any application that requires a minimum
quality of service. True application neutrality may, in fact, sometimes
require a close vertical relationship between a broadband operator and
Internet service provider. The reason is that the operator is ultimately

21. C{ Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (on the meaning of neutrality in the context of church and
state).
22. Efforts to add quality of service functionality' to the Internet protocol, such as the
IETFs DiffServ and IntServ's approaches, have never been implemented to provide end-toend quality of service on an IP network.
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the gatekeeper of quality of service for a given user, because only the
broadband operator is in a position to offer service guarantees that extend
to the end-user's computer (or network). Delivering the full possible
range of applications either requires an impracticable upgrade of the
entire network, or some tolerance of close vertical relationships.
This point indicts a strict open-access requirement. To the extent
open access regulation prevents broadband operators from architectural
cooperation with ISPs for the purpose of providing QgS dependent
applications, it could hurt the cause of network neutrality. 23 By
threatening the vertical relationship required for certain application
types, it could maintain IP's discrimination in favor of data applications.
More broadly, this argument shows that the concept of network
neutrality cannot be taken as counsel against all vertical integration. 24
A second, and simpler, problem with open access from a neutrality
perspective is that the structural remedy may also be an underinclusive
means of ensuring network neutrality. Competition among ISPs does
not necess¥ily mean that broadband operators will simply retreat to
acting as passive carriers in the last mile. As the survey in this study
shows, operators continue to have reasons to want to control usage of the
Internet based on their status as broadband operators, regardless of ISP
competition. Hence, open-access does not end the debate over whether
broadband operators are capable of engaging in undesirable behavior
from the perspective of the public network.
For these reasons, this paper seeks to see if we might do better to
address questions of network neutrality directly, through the remedial
concept of "broadband discrimination," rather than through structural
solutions like open-access.

II. THE CONCEPT OF BROADBAND DISCRIMINATION
The question of controlling what people do with their network
services is hardly new to communications regulation. It is as least as old
as Hush-A-Phone, and the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the 1934
Communications Act to find that the subscriber has a "right reasonably
to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being
publicly detrimental."25

23. This might happen, for example, if an open-access regulation slowed the
development of vertically integrated layer 2 / layer 3 architectures.
24. Ultimately, this line of argument echoes the economists' point that efficiencies exist
from vertical integration. The point here is to show that principles of network neutrality lead
to the same conclusion.
25. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266,269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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Nor is the prevention of discrimination a new topic in
communications · regulation.
Over the history of communications
regulation, the Government has employed both common carriage
requirements (similar to the neutrality regime discussed here) and limits
on vertical integration as means of preventing unwanted discrimination.
The goal of this section is to further explain how a common carriage or
anti-discrimination model might be better developed to address the
current Internet environment;
Why might thinking in discrimination terms be useful? Only
because it borrows from what is familiar to achieve new goals. What is
critical to the study of discrimination regimes is the existence of both
justified and suspect bases of discrimination. For example, in the
employment context, where discrimination norms are most developed,
employers are generally permitted to fire or refuse to hire individuals for
a range of reasons, such as education-level, intelligence, and demeanor. 26
The law implicitly recognizes that it is essential that the employer retain
the freedom to fire incompetents and hire only those with necessary
skills. On the other hand, criteria such as race, sex, or national origin are
suspect criteria of discrimination, but can only be justified by a bona fide
rationale. 27
While discrimination among Internet applications is a different
context, the framework of analysis can be usefully retained. As the
proposal in Part IV develops, it is possible to distinguish between classes
of restrictions that should generally be allowable, and those that might
raise susp1c10n. Overall, there is a need to strike a balance between
legitimate interests in discriminating against certain uses, and reasons
that are suspect either due to irrationality or because of costs not
internalized by the broadband operator.
To get a better feeling for what a discrimination approach entails, it
is helpful to map out some of the extremes of clearly permissible and
clearly troublesome discrimination in the broadband context. At one
extreme, many of the usage or application bans surveyed are clearly
justified.
For example, operators usually ban users from using
applications or conduct that are meant to hurt the network or other
users, like network viruses. 28 It is true that this is a departure from

26. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2002) (codification of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
27. Seeid
28. An example from the Cox Acceptable Use Policy:
You are prohibited from posting, transmitting or disseminating any information or
software that contains a virus, Trojan horse, worm or other harmful program or that
generates levels of traffic sufficient to impede others' ability to send or retrieve
information. Prohibited conduct of this type includes denial of service attacks or
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network neutrality, because it disfavors a class of applications--those that
are disruptive to the network. Yet, it is clear that the operator has acted
to solve a problem of a negative externality-the costs imposed by one
user on others. Few could or would argue that this is a bad thing.
At the opposite extreme, · the harm from totally unjustified
discrimination is equally clear. Leaving aside whether operators would
actually act in this way, imagine that the nation's broadband operators
came to feel that IP "chat" programs were just a waste of time, and were
able to use their control over the last mile to ban their use. 29 Such
discrimination has both a direct harm as well as several negative
externalities. The direct harm is obvious: existing broadband consumers
who like chat programs lose the opportunity to use a valued application,
while creators of chat programs lose whatever revenue opportunity chat
programs create. But the more interesting costs are the various losses of
positive externalities. Three stand out. First, if chat programs have
positive externalities for other network applications--say, if the chat
program is middle-ware for a file-exchange program, as in the case of
Aimster---dependent applications are hurt as well. Second, to the degree
other applications depend on a critical mass of high-bandwidth users,
they are hurt by potential subscribers who at the margin are not willing
to pay for broadband without the chat programs. Finally, to the extent
chat programs have positive social externalities, like helping people to
plan meetings or meet new boyfriends, the public suffers too. 30 Thus,
there are considerable potential costs from an irrational or unjustified ban
on certain application types.
These are the easy cases. We next consider whether reasons like
price discrimination and bandwidth management should justify
discrimination among applications.

A. Price Discrimination & Restrictions on Commercial Use
As detailed in the survey below, nearly every operator places limits
on "commercial" use, sometimes including limits on Virtual Private

similarly disruptive transmissions, as well as transmissions containing other harmful
or malicious features.
Cox Communications Policies, Acceptable Use Policy, Cox Communications, Inc., at
http://support.cox.net/custsup/policies/acceptableuse.shtml (revised Feb. 3, 2003).
29. For example, by screening chat program activity by TCP port number. Such a
restriction could be avoided, but it suffices for the example.
30. Conversely, as we will see in a second, if chat programs have negative externalities
because they actually do waste everyone's time, the operators may have done the world a big
favor.
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Networks, as well as limits on acting as a server. 31 Why might an
operator put such a restriction on usage? Doing so obviously makes the
service less attractive to consumers who might want to act in a
commercial way, even in a fairly casual manner. 32
. The simple answer is price discrimination. That this is the case is
not just intuition, but can be confirmed by company policy. As evidence
we can consider Comcast's reply in 2001 to a user who had complained
about the ban on VPN usage on Comcast's network:
Thank you for your message.
High traffic telecommuting while utilizing a VPN can adversely
affect the condition of the network while disrupting the connection
of our regular residential subscribers.
To accommodate the needs of our customers who do choose to
operate VPN, Comcast offers the Comcast @Home Professional
product. @Home Pro is designed to meet the needs of the ever
growing population of small office/home office customers and
telecommuters that need to take advantage of protocols such as VPN.
This product will cost $95 per month, and afford you with standards
which differ from the standard residential product.

If you're interested in upgrading .... 33

As the letter shows, Cable and DSL operators typically offer
commercial packages at a considerable markup from basic broadband
service. For example, phone companies like Verizon or BellSouth offer
T-1 lines at prices far higher than basic DSL or cable service. 34 The goal
is to exact a premium price from the customers who most desire the
commercial service. Allowing subscribers to basic service to operate
hosting services might erode such profits.
It is true that mainstream antitrust analysis has come to see price
discrimination as generally uncontentious, or at least ambiguous. 35 As

31. See, e.g., Cable Modem Service Subscription Agreement, Time Warner Cable, at
http://help.twcable.com/htmVtwc_sub_agreement.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter Time Wamer Usage Agreement].
32. Network design already discourages hosting activity, because most broadband services
give asymmetric bandwidth (more downstream than upstream) and a dynamic, as opposed to
fixed, IP address. These design features preclude serious commercial website operation, but
leave room for casual hosting operations, such as participating in a peer-to-peer network.
33. See Comcast VPN letter, Practically Networked, at http://www.practically
networked.com/news/comcast.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
34. A T-1 line, providing 1.5 mbps of symmetric data, is usually priced at over $1000 per
month.
35. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 203-06 (2d ed. 2001).
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between consumers and producers, it hurts some consumers and helps
others, while raising the producers' profits. Yet this analysis can, and
should, change as in the broadband context, because the practice of price
discrimination may have external effects on the process of innovation and
competition among applications.
That is to say, while price
discrimination among applications may not be troubling from a static
perspective (as between existing consumers and producers), it may have
dynamic consequences, for the competitive development of new
applications.
We can see this in the present example of a ban on commercial
operations. The goal, as we've seen, is to maintain a customary markup
on business services. But the restrictions on the market for what can be
termed commercial applications used on home connections come at a
cost. The direct effect of a ban on hosting is to make the connection
slightly less valuable to the basic consumer, which presumably the
operator takes into account in her pricing scheme. But there are other
costs that the operator may not internalize. The bans on commercial use
or acting as a server constrain the competitive development of
applications that might rely on such a function. In the Comcast letter
example the problem was VPN applications, which typically can rely on
end-users functioning both as clients and servers, and which can be
classified as a commercial use. 36 And it is also the case that hosting
services may have positive social externalities not taken into account by
the operator's decision. For example, VPNs may facilitate greater
productivity among employees, a benefit that may be lost in their
prohibition.
Another major restriction that interests broadband operators is
barring users from providing content to the public or running servers.
Why do broadband operators act in this way, if, again, it might lower the
value of its service to its users? One reason may be the price
discrimination rationale discussed above. Yet from the reports of cable
operators themselves, a major goal is bandwidth management. 37 The.
restrictions appear to be efforts to manage how users consume bandwidth
by discriminating against types of usage. As the survey showed, such
restrictions are more common on cable networks, which operate shared
connections and tend to lack technological means for restricting
individual bandwidth consumption.38
Hence, the restrictions, for
36. "Servents" in Gnutella terminology.
37. See, e.g., JUSTIN PEARSE, UK shrugs off American broadband troubles, ZDNET
NEWS.COM, at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/O,,t269-s2077792,00.html (Mar. 20, 2000).
38. More recent incarnations of the DOCSIS protocol attempt to add better QgS
functionality, but implementation at this date seems to be scarce. See Cable
Modem/DOCSJS1'M, CABLELABS, athttp://www.cablemodem.com/faq (last visited Mar. 13,
2003) [hereinafter CABLELABS, DOCS!Sj.
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example, on running "game" or "ftp" programs are most likely efforts to
eliminate a potential source of bandwidth consumption.
The goal of bandwidth management poses an even more difficult
question than does price discrimination. The goal of bandwidth
management is, at a general level, aligned with network neutrality. As
discussed above, certain classes of applications will never function
properly unless bandwidth and quality of service are guaranteed. Hence,
the absence of bandwidth management can interfere with application
development and competition.
There are good reasons to question whether price-discrimination,
without more, should be permissible grounds for allowing discrimination
among applications. As we have seen, such usage restrictions may harm
consumer welfare without offering a public benefit. This is particularly
the case when there are less-restrictive means for engaging in price
discrimination. Selling different tiers of service (low, medium, and high
bandwidth) does not favor or discriminate against particular application·
types. In the presence of a means for differentiating among customers in
a way that does not distort the process of competitive innovation, we
should view discrimination on the basis of application with suspicion.
Similarly, while managing bandwidth is a laudable goal, its
achievement through restricting certain application types is an
unfortunate solution. The result is obviously a selective disadvantage for
certain application markets. The less restrictive means is, as above, the
technological management of bandwidth.
Application-restrictions
should, at best, be a stopgap solution to the problem of competing
bandwidth demands.

B. Self-Regulation and the Educational Properties ofRegulation
The previous sections show that broadband operators may want to
discriminate amongst the uses of its network for various reasons. We
have also seen that there are a variety of justifications--some good and
some not--for such restrictions. Even if the goal itself is legitimate, the
method of achieving that goal may be suspect. The question, then, is
whether cable operators will self-regulate and come up with the best
policies on their own, or whether regulation may be necessary.
In this section I argue that while cable operators may come to
understand that broadband discrimination is not in their best interest,
both the threat of, or actual implementation of, anti-discrimination
regulation may otherwise serve a useful informational or educational
function. Like anti-discrimination legislation in other contexts, it may
serve an educational function, forcing operators to ask whether the
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restrictions they draft are actually serving their interest in maximizing the
value of their services.
As a baseline, the attractiveness of broadband service is a function of
the applications it offers the consumer. Hence, any restriction on use
will lower the value of the service, and consequently either the price the
operator can charge or the number of customers who will sign up
(assuming a negative demand curve). To make this clear: if an operator
operated a service that screened all uses except web-access alone it might
be worth $30 to the average consumer, while a service that offered access
to every kind of Internet application--including, say, the opportunity to
get copyrighted music for free--might be worth $50. The difference in
the value to the consumer will affect the price the operator can charge.
This basic point is captured by Joseph Farell and Philip Weiser's
argument that a "platform monopolist has a powerful incentive to be a
good steward of the applications sector for its platform. "39 The point
reflects, as the authors stress, classic arguments from antitrust. A
monopolist may still want competition in its input markets, to maximize
profit in the monopoly market.
But it is easy for a steward to recognize that the platform should
support as many applications as possible. The more difficult challenge
has always been the dynamic aspect: recognizing that serving a tangible
goal-like controlling bandwidth usage--may affect the intangible status
of the Internet as an application development platform. Some of the
restrictions, such as those on running various types of server, are
applications that are now likely to be used by only a small minority of
broadband users. Their sacrifice may appear like a good cost-saving
measure.
More generally, the idea that discrimination may not always be
rational is a well-understood phenomenon. In the employment context,
the various discrimination laws have an explicitly educational function.
For example, an express purpose of age discrimination legislation is to
force employers to reconsider stereotyped perceptions of the competency
of the elderly in the workforce. 40 Broadband operators may simply
disfavor certain uses of their network for irrational reasons, such as
hypothetic security concerns or exaggerated fears of legal liability.
Additionally, a restriction may become obsolete: adopted at a certain
time for a certain reason that no long matters. Practical experience
suggests that such things happen.

39. Farell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 21. This they describe as the "internalization of
complementary efficiencies, or ICE."
40. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) ("the ADEA is
designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further important social
policies").
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For these reasons, anti-discrimination regulation or the threat
thereof can also serve a useful educational function. It can force
broadband operators to consider whether their restrictions are in their
long-term best interests. And in the absence of law it can establish
norms around discrimination that may preserve network neutrality over
the long term.
The events of the year 2003 provide evidence to support the utility
of a regulatory threat in promoting desirable conduct. Both Comcast
and Cox Communications openly disavowed their old practices of
placing bans on Virtual Private Networks, and filed documents with the
FCC to that respect. 41 The cable industry has furthermore begun to
publicly insist that it wants to avoid broadband discrimination in the
future, stating, for example, that "Cable Believes in Open Connectivity
for the Internet." 42
There is the possibility that the current regulatory process has forced
cable operators to rethink their practices and conclude that
discrimination is not in their long term self-interest. The process
demonstrates the continuing utility of communications regulators in
remaining appraised on potential problems of anti-competitive practices.

Ill. A SURVEY OF BROADBAND USAGE RESTRICTIONS
Have broadband operators tended to favor certain uses of the
Internet? To what extent? The goal of this section is to answer these
questions, to the extent possible, for broadband networks during the year
2002. 43
The study divides measures of favoritism and discrimination into
two categories: contractual and architectural. The study surveyed the
network designs (to the extent that the information was available) and
usage restrictions in subscriber agreements and incorporated acceptable

41. See Comcast Corp., FCC Ex Parte Letter, May 9, 2002 ("the 'VPN restriction' about
which certain parties have complained has been eliminated from and is no longer part of
Comcast's subscriber agreements and terms of service for its high-speed Internet customers.");
Cox Enterprises Inc., FCC Ex Parte Letter, May 1, 2003 ("Cox hereby informs the
Commission that the language of that [VPN] provision has been changed ... ").
42. NTCA, Cable Believes in Open Connectivity for the lntemet, at
http://www.ncta.com/legislative/legAffairs.cfm?legRegID=20; see also NTCA, Ex Parte
Letter, Sept. 8, 2003 (arguing that network neutrality legislation is unnecessary because of
cable's commitment to non-discrimination.).
43. Unfortunately, nearly any feature of network design or policy can be described as a
deviation from a "purely" neutral design. Something as innocuous as the length of the IP
packet header could, potentially, help or hurt certain applications. To avoid an exercise in the
esoteric, the goal of this section is to study major, intentional deviations from neutrality that
clearly favor certain application types over others.
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use policies from the 10 largest cable ope~ators (AT&T, 44 Time Warner,
Comcast, Cox Communications, Adelphia, Mediacom, Charter
Communications, CableOne, Insight, and Cablevision), and 6 major
DSL operators (Verizon, SBC, ~est, BellSouth, Sprint and
WorldCom). A chart containing full results can be found in the
appendix.
The survey showed the following general results. On the whole,
broadband operators' networks and usage restrictions favored the
applications of the late 1990s (primarily the World Wide Web and other
client-server applications), and disfavored more recent applications and
usage, like home networking, peer-to-peer applications, and home
telecommuting.
There are differences between cable and DSL operators. On the
contractual side, cable operators tended to impose far more restrictions
on usage than do DSL operators. Major differences exist with respect to
the extent of restrictions on home networking, operation of servers,
commercial use, and overuse of bandwidth.
An illustrative example is the difference in attitudes toward home
networking. 45 At the extremes, then-Cable operator AT&T Broadband
defined home networking as "theft of services" and threatened subscribers
with civil and criminal penalties. 46 In contrast, DSL provider Verizon
makes it clear in its service contract that home networking is permissible,
as does Sprint. 47
·
There existed variation between individual cable operators and DSL
operators on some of the restrictions. On the cable side, AT&T
Broadband and Comcast (later combined to form the nation's largest
cable operator), stood out for having the strictest usage restrictions.
AOL Time-Warner, Charter Communications and smaller operators
CableOne and Insight Broadband had the least restrictions. Among
DSL operators, BellSouth stood out with the most restrictions, similar in
extent to a cable operator. Overall, perhaps the most "liberal" broadband
provider was DSL provider Sprint.
Sprint has very few usage
restrictions, tells subscribers in FAQ§ that they may run home networks,

44. At the time the survey was conducted, AT&T and Comcast were still operating
independently.
45. Home networking refers to the practice of sharing a broadband connection amongst
all of the computers in a home, as opposed to the single computer attached to the cable
modem. This usually requires the purchase of additional equipment, such as a home router.
46. AT&T Broadband lntemet Subscriber Agreement, § 6(g), available at
http:!/help. broadband.att.com/listfaqs.jsp?category_id=973&category-id=34 (last revised Dec.
5, 2001).
47. Veriwn
Online Internet Access,
Terms of Service,
available at
http://www.veriwn.net/policies/internetaa.asp (2003).
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web servers, and promises users that they "will have complete
unrestricted access to all content available on the lnternet." 48
On the architectural side, the outstanding deviation from neutrality
in broadband networks today is the asymmetric bandwidth common
across networks. Other, future controls may include application specific
controls, as the survey of equipment vendors' offerings shows.

A. Contractual Restrictions
We first consider the individual types of restrictions found in usage
agreements, focusing attention on restrictions that are likely to influence
the development of certain application-types. The following chart shows
the 13 main types of restrictions along with the percentage of major cable
operators and DSL operators who stated such restrictions:
TABLE 1. MAJOR USAGE RESTRICTIONS
RESTRICTION
Using a Virtual Private Network
Attaching WiFi Equipment
Making the Connection a Network End Point
Using Home Networking
Misusing IP Addresses
Any Commercial or Business Use
Operating a Server or Providing Public Information
Overusing Bandwidth
Reselling Bandwidth or Acting as an ISP
Conducting Spam or Consumer Fraud
Hacking or Causing Security Breaches
Any Unlawful Purpose
Any Offensive or Immoral Purpose

CABLE

DSL

10%
10%
10%
40%
60%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
33%
33%
33%
33%
100%
100%
100%
100%

The appendix indicates which operators in the survey implemented
the restrictions above. The following pages provide further details on the
language of the most controversial restrictions: (1) providing information
to the public or operating a server, (2) commercial uses, (3) Home
Networking, and (4) WiFi network operation.

"48. Sprint FastConnect DSL, Frequendy Asked Questions,
http://csb.sprint.com/home/local/dslhelp/faq.html#genl6 (2003).

available

at
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1. Restrictions on Providing Content

Nearly every cable operator and one third of DSL operators
restricted operating a server and/or providing content to the public. 49
This restriction has the greatest potential significance because it affects
the broadest class of applications--those where the end-user shares
content, as opposed to simply downloading content. The potential
breadth of server restriction can be seen from AT&T Broadband's
acceptable use agreement:
[Subscriber may not] run programs, equipment or servers from the
Premises which provide network content or any other services to
anyone outside of the your home . . . . Examples of prohibited
programs and equipment include, but are not limited to, mail, ftp,
http, file sharing, game, newsgroup, proxy, IRC servers, multi-user
interactive forums and Wi-Fi devices. 50

Again, this restriction can be understood as favoring a "one-tomany" or vertical model of application over a "many-to-many" or
"horiwntal" model. In application design terms, the restriction favors
client-server applications over peer-to-peer designs. 51 If taken seriously,
the inability to provide content or a_ct as a server would serve to restrict a
major class of network applications.
Not all the restrictions are as broad as AT&T Broadband's. More
typical is a simple ban on servers, as seen in this example from Cox
Systems: "Servers You may not operate, or allow others to operate,
servers of any type or any other device, equipment, and/or software
providing server-like functionality in connection with the Service, unless
expressly authorized by Cox."52 Others, like Charter Communications,
name banned applications: "Customer will not use, nor allow others to
use, Customer's home computer as a web server, FfP server, file server

49. The exception is Time Warner. See infra Appendix.
50. AT&T Broadband lntemet Acceptable Use Policy, 1 xiv, available at
http://help.broadband.att.com/faq.jsp?content_id=1107&category_id=34 (revised July 25,
2002).
51. The Internet's most popular application of the early 1990s-'-the world wide webfollowed a client-server design, where a single specialized, centralized server provides services
to a large number of clients. However, today an increasing number of applications use fully or
partially decentralized designs. Email was always partially decentralized, for example, and the
many popular "chat" programs embody a design that technically requires the user to act as a
server as well as a client. Similarly, users who want to access a home computer from work
(using, for example, rlogin) need to set up the home computer to act as a server. Peer-to-peer
application designs also ask home users to act both as a client and server.
52. Cox
Systems,
Acceptable
Use
Policy
§
6,
available
at
http://www.cox.com/iNetincludes/policy/acceptable.asp (updated Apr. 28, 2003). See also
AT&T Broadband lntemet Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 50.
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or game server or to run any other server applications."53 The narrowest
form of server restriction is seen in the Verizon terms of service
agreement: "You may not use .the Service to host a dedicated or
commercial server."54 Finally, contrary to others, DSL provider Sprint
suggests that consumers may, in fact, run a web server, based on the
following excerpt from Sprint's F AQsite:

Q Can I run a web server?
A: Yes it is possible to set-up a web server using your Sprint
FastConnect DSL service. 55

2. Bans on Commercial Use
A second restriction with potential implications for application
development is a limit on "commercial" or "enterprise" use of residential
broadband connections. Every cable operator and most DSL operators
surveyed had some ban on using a basic residential broadband connection
for commercial use.
The broadest and most controversial of such restrictions barred
home users from using "Virtual Private Network" (VPN) services, which
are used by telecommuters to connect to their work network through a
secure connection. Cox Systems provides an example of a ban on Virtual
Private Ne·tworks: "You agree not to use the Service for operation as an
Internet service provider, or for any other business enterprise, including,
without limitation, virtual private network usage, IP address translation,
or similar facilities intended to provide additional access." 56 More typical
bans on commercial use came in the following form, as seen in the Time
Warner Subscriber Conduct provision in its acceptable use agreement:
The ISP Service as offered and provided under this Agreement is a
residential service offered for personal, non-commercial use only.
Subscrber will not resell or redistribute (whether for a fee or
otherwise) the ISP Service, or any portion thereof, or otherwise
charge others to use the ISP Service, or any portion thereof.
Subscriber agrees not to use the ISP Service for operation as an
internet service provider, for the hosting of websites (other than as
expressly permitted as part of the ISP Service) or for any enterprise

53. Charter Communications Pipeline, Acceptable Use Policy § l(A), available at
http://www.chartercom.com/site/rules.asp#aup (last checked Oct. 8, 2003).
54. Veriwn Online Internet Access, Terms ofService, supra note 47, at§ 2.4(C).
55. Sprint FastConnect DSL, Qpestions & Answers, available at http://csb.sprint.com/
servlet/Faq/faq_category?category=DSLGenQyestions (2003).
56. Cox Systems, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 52, at § 5.
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purpose whether or not the enterprise is directed toward making a
profit. 57

Again, the limitations found in DSL restrictions were far less extensive.
For example, the BellSouth subscriber agreement mixed the restrictions
on providing content and acting commercially as follows: "Subscribers
may not provide public or commercial information over such [residential
DSL] connections."58
3. Home Networking
When home networking first became widespread in 2002, four of
ten of the nation's largest cable operators contractually limited the
deployment of home networks. 59 They did so by stating restrictions on
the number of computers that could be attached to a single connection.
The strongest example of such a usage restriction in 2002 came from
AT&T Broadband:
THEFT OF SERVICE. Customer shall not connect the Service or any
AT&T Broadband Equipment to more computers, either on or
outside of the Premises, than are reflected in Customer's account
with AT&T Broadband. Customer acknowledges that any
unauthorized receipt of the Service constitutes theft of service, which
is a violation of federal law and can result in both civil and criminal
penalties. In addition, if the violations are willful and for commercial
advantage or private financial gain, the penalties may be increased. 60

A milder approach was taken by Aldelphia's online FAQ
Can I network more than one computer?
Yes. Please check with a reputable. computer electronics retailer for
home networking solutions that are right for you. Adelphia will
support a cable modem that is connected to a hub or router to the
gateway or host computer. Adelphia does not install or support the

57. Time Warner, Cable Modem Service Subscription Agreement § 5(a), available at
http://help.twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agreement.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
58. BellSouth
Internet
Service,
Acceptable
Use Policies,
available at
http://home.bellsouth.net/csbellsouth/s/editorial.dll?fromspage=cg/legal/legal_homepage.htm
&categoryid=&bfromind=354&eeid=376138&eetype=article&render=y5ck= (last visited Oct.
8, 2003).
59. MediaOne, Comcast, AT&T and Adelphia. Due to enforcement difficulties and the
ongoing regulatory proceedings at the Federal Communications Commission, most of these
restrictions have been rescinded.
60. AT&T Broadband Internet Subscriber Agreement,§ 6(g), athttp://www.attbi.com/
general-info/bb_terms.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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network. Adelphia Power Link may not be connected to a broadcast
server of any kind. 61

In contrast, some DSL operators in their agreements explicitly
acknowledged that multiple computers could be connected to the DSL
connection. As Veriwn's agreement stated: "You may connect multiple
computers/devices within a single home or office location to your DSL
modem and/or router to access the Service, but only through a single
DSL account and a single IP address obtained from Veriwn Online. "62
Other DSL providers were vague. For example, in BellSouth's terms of
service: "Unless otherwise specified in the BellSouth Internet Service
subscriber's pricing plan agreement, sharing of accounts and/or
connections on unlimited usage plans with anyone other than immediate
family members in the same dwelling is strictly prohibited." 63
4. Restrictions on Wireless (WiFi) Networks

In addition to restrictions on home networking, several cable
operators signaled a particular interest in controlling the deployment of
home wireless networks. This is clearest with AT&T Broadband: They
explicitly banned the connection of "Wi-Fi" equipment. 64 The provider
also made it a breach of the subscriber's agreement to maintain a WiFi
service that is available to outsiders. "[It is a breach of the agreement to]
resell the Service or otherwise make available to anyone outside the
Premises the ability to use the Service (i.e. WiFi, or other methods of
networking). "65

B. Architectural Controls, Present & Future
1. Present

Today, the principal deviation from network neutrality through
architecture is, and continues to be, asymmetric bandwidth: that is, the
practice of designing networks to provide more "downstream" bandwidth
than "upstream." It is difficult to obtain a full set of data on the extent of

61. Adelphia FAQ. Home Networking, at http://www.adelphia.com/high_speed
_internet/faqs.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
62. Verizon Online's Terms of Service, § 2.5B, at · http://www.verizon.net/
policies/internetaa.asp.
63. See BellSouth, Acceptable Use Polides, supra note 58.
64. AT&T Broadband Internet Acceptable Use Agreement, supra note 50, at 1 14
("Examples of prohibited ... equipment include ... Wi-Fi.").
65. Id at 1 ix. Cox Systems, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 52, at 17, has a similar
restriction.
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asymmetry, because many cable operators do not make public the
maximum bandwidth permitted by their networks. However, from the
few sources of data that are available, we find that there is greater
asymmetry in cable networks than DSL--though the shared architecture
of cable networks makes the significance of this fact unclear. Published
DSL rates included residential bandwidth with as low as 1:1 ratios, while
the modal ratio is 6:1 ratios. 66 The few cable networks with public data
promised maximum bandwidth ratios ranging from 5.3:1 (Time Warner
/ Earthlink) to as much as 12:1 (Cox Communications). 67
As others have recognized, allowing more downstream than
upstream bandwidth obviously favors the development of applications
that are one-to-many, or client-server in design. Applications that
would demand residential accounts to deliver content as quickly as they
receive it will do less well under conditions of asymmetric bandwidth.
2. Future - Better Bandwidth Management or Application Layer
Controls?
It is difficult to predict what application controls broadband
operators might implement in the future. Yet future possibilities can be
gleaned from the marketing efforts of equipment vendors who target the
cable and DSL market. Two trends can be briefly noted, though the full
topic is well beyond the scope of this paper.
First, over the last several years, several companies have begun to
market equipment described to facilitate application-based screening and
control for broadband networks. Two prominent examples are Allot
Communications and Packeteer Communications. The former markets
a product named "NetEnforcer" to cable and DSL operators, 68 promising
to control problems from both peer-to-peer traffic and unauthorized
WiFi connections. 69 Allot's competitor, Packeteer, markets a similar
product, named "PacketShaper," described as "an application intelligent
traffic management appliance providing visibility into and control over
network utilization and application performance. "70 The company claims
that the product is used on hundreds of University campuses, primarily to

66. See infra Appendix.
67. Id
68. Allot Communications Netenforcer® Data Sheet, at http://www.allot.com/htmV
products_netenforcer_sp.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
69. Jim Barthold, Allot looks to help servers with bandwidth congestion problems,
TELEPHONY. ONLINE.COM, available at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom_allot_looks
_help/index.htm (Dec. 3, 2002).
70. Packeteer, at http://www.packeteer.com/products/packetshaper.com (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
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control peer-to-peer traffic. 71 When this survey was conducted, despite
the marketing efforts of both companies, there was no evidence of
deployment by cable or DSL operators. It is therefore impossible to
conclude whether broadband operators will begin using technological
means to facilitate restrictions on usage.
Second, vendors of cable data equipment promise improved
bandwidth management capabilities as between individual customers on
cable networks. 72 This is the promise of the D0CSIS 73 1.1 and 2.0
standards, which are an update to the current DOCSIS 1.0 standard in
use today. 74 As the new equipment is not yet widely deployed, these
claims or their impact cannot be verified.

C. Condusions & Evidence ofEnforcement
What, generally, can be concluded from this survey? On the one
hand, there is no broad effort to ban everything that might be said to
threaten the interests of cable and DSL operators. For example, cable
operators have not now barred streaming video, despite the potential to
compete with cable television, and despite Dan Somers' famous
comment that "AT&T didn't spend $56 billion to get into the cable
business to have the blood sucked out of [its] veins." 75 This conclusion is
reinforced by the general perception that broadband access is not
substantially limited.
To what degree are these usage restrictions enforced? While there
is little formal data on enforcement patterns, there exists anecdotal
evidence of enforcement on websites like DSL Reports, 76 which are
dedicated to users complaining about broadband service and usage
restrictions. Some examples of enforcement include the enforcement of
monthly or daily bandwidth limits through a threatening to terminate or
restrict the accounts of users who use too much bandwidth in a single
month. For example, Cox Cable in November 2002 sent letters to users

71. Gwendolyn Mariano, Schools dedare file-swapping truce, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-859705.html?tag=m (Mar. 14, 2002).
72. See, e.g, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/servpro/solutions/cable (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003).
73. DOCSIS stands for Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications. See Seven
Cable Modem Manufacturers Seek DOCSIS Certiflcation, CABLELABS, at
http://www.cablelabs.com/news/newsletter/SPECS/specnewsaug/ news/pgs/story2.html (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003).
74. For an explication of the claims ofDOCSIS 1.1 and 2.0, see CABLELABS, DOCSIS,
supra note 38.
75. See David Lieberman, Media Giants' Net Change Establish Strong Foothold
Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at B3 (Dan Somers was CEO of AT&T Broadband at
the time the comment was reported).
76. See BROADBAND REPORTS.COM, athttp://www.dslreports.com (Mar. 2002).
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who downloaded more than 2 gigabytes of bandwidth per day, or 30
gigabytes of bandwidth per month. 77 Other cable operators, though no
DSL providers, have suggested similar policies may be on their way. 78 In
addition, broadband consumers have complained of efforts to enforce
specific bans on applications, such as threats to enforce contractual limits
on VPN operations 79 and users who run file-sharing applications. 80

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR NE1WORK NEUTRALITY
Recognizing that discrimination in broadband service is a potential
problem is one thing; constructing an approach to dealing with it, is
another. The open-access proposal, as we saw earlier, advocated
structural separation between Internet service providers and broadband
operators. This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but it has the
disadvantage of retarding potential efficiencies of integration. This
approach also may fail to deter other forms of discrimination.
What follows is a proposed antidiscrimination principle (a rule, only
if necessary). The effort is to strike a balance: to forbid broadband
operators, absent a showing of harm, from restricting what users do with
their Internet connection, while giving the operator general freedom to
manage bandwidth consumption and other matters of local concern.
The principle achieves this by adopting the basic principle that
broadband operators should have full freedom to "police what they own"
(the local network) while restrictions based on inter-network indicia
should be viewed with suspicion.
This non-discrimination principle works by recognizing a
distinction between local network restrictions, which are generally
allowable, and inter-network restrictions, which should be viewed as
suspect. The principle represents ultimately an effort to develop
forbidden and permissible grounds for discrimination in broadband usage
restrictions.

77. See Karl Bode, Defining Gluttony: Cox Cable Gets Sped.ic, at
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/23465 (Nov. 12, 2002).
78. John Borland, ISP download caps to slow swapping? CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-975320.html (Nov. 26, 2002).
79. Practically
Networked
Earthweb,
VPN
Comcast
Letter,
at
http://www.practicallynetworked.com/news/comcast.htm. (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
80. Many users have accused cable operators of blocking specific file-sharing applications
like KaZaa, through port blocking, though the reports are unverified. See, e.g., RoadRunner
Blocking kaZaA, ZEROPAID.COM, at http://www.zeropaid.com/news/articles/auto/
07142002a Quly 13, 2002).
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A. Let Operators Police Mat They Own
Broadband carriers are members of two networks. They are each
members of a local network, which they own and manage individually.
They are also members of the inter-network, which they collectively
manage with other service providers.
FIGURE 1: BROADBAND CARRIERS, MEMBERS OFTwO NETWORKS
Inter-Network
Local Broadband Network

End.Users

Once we recognize that carriers are engaged in a collective
management scheme, the origin of the externalized cost problem
described above becomes clear. The effects of local network restrictions
will, usually, affect only the network run by a single service provider.
Such restrictions moreover, are necessary for good network management.
In contrast, by definition, restrictions at the inter-network layer or above
will always affect the entire network, and can create externality problems.

B. The Neutrality Principle
What follows is an example of a network neutrality law:
§_Forbidding Broadband Discrimination
(a) Broadband Users have the right reasonably to use their Internet
connection in ways which are privately beneficial without being
publicly detrimental. Accordingly, Broadband Operators shall
impose no restrictions on the use of an Internet connection
except as necessary to:
(1) Comply with any legal duty created by federal, state or local
laws, or as necessary to comply with any executive order,
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(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)
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warrant, legal injunction, subpoena, or other duly authorized
governmental directive;
Prevent physical harm to the local Broadband Network
caused by any network attachment or network usage;
Prevent Broadband users from interfering with other
Broadband or Internet Users' use of their Internet
connections, including but not limited to neutral limits on
bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission of unsolicited
email, and limits on the distribution of computer viruses,
worms, and limits on denial-of service-or other attacks on
others;
Ensure the quality of the Broadband service, by eliminating
delay, jitter or other technical aberrations;
Prevent violations of the security of the Broadband network,
including all efforts to gain unauthorized access to
computers on the Broadband network or Internet;
Serve any other purpose specifically authorized by the
Federal Communications Commission, based on a weighing
of the specific costs and benefit of the restriction.

(b) As used in this section,
(1) "Broadband Operators" means a service provider that
provides high-speed connections to the Internet using
whatever technology, including but not limited to cable
networks, telephone networks, fiber optic connections, and
wireless transmission;
(2) "Broadband Users" means residential and business customers
of a Broadband Operator;
(3) "Broadband Network" means the physical network owned
and operated by the Broadband Operator;
(4) "Restrictions on the Use of an Internet Connection" means
any contractual, technical, or other limits placed with or
without notice on the Broadband user's Internet
Connection.

This law expressed the inter-network neutrality principle,
operationally, as a non-discrimination rule. As the analysis above
recognized, the concept of a total ban on network discrimination is
counterproductive. Rather, we need distinguish between forbidden
grounds of discrimination, those that distort secondary markets, and
permissible grounds, those necessary to network administration and
harm to the network.
Reflecting the dual-network membership just described, it will be
inter-network criteria of discrimination that cause concern. In technical
terms, this means discrimination based on IP addresses, domain name,
cookie information, TCP port, and others as we will describe in greater
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detail below. Hence, the general principle can be stated as follows:
absent evidence of harm to the local network or the interests of other
users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in how they treat traffic
on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network criteria.
The negative inference (expressed most clearly in exceptions (a)(3)
and (4)) is that operators generally may discriminate in their treatment of
traffic on the basis of local network criteria. In technical terms, this
means imposing restrictions on the basis of what network engineers call
"link" or "layer 2" information, like bandwidth, jitter, or other local
Qyality of Service indicia.

C. In Practice: Online Gaming
Popular online gaming applications81 like Everquest, Asheron's Call,
or Online Qyake tend to be bandwidth intensive, particularly compared
with episodic applications like email. · As seen above, concerned
broadband carriers have therefore been inclined to restrict the usage of
such applications. However, with the neutrality principle in mind, we
can distinguish between a "better" and a "worse" way for this to happen.
First, in today's environment, a broadband carrier could block traffic
from gaming sites. It could do it either by enforcing a contractual
provision in a usage agreement, or in the future, using its control of the
local network to block traffic from gaming sites based on either
application information, or the IP address of the application provider. 82
Some carriers might elect, for a given supplemental fee, to remove the
filter for specified users.
Under the neutrality principle here proposed, this approach would
be frowned upon. Instead, a carrier concerned about bandwidth
consumption would need to invest in policing bandwidth usage, not
blocking individual applications. Users interested in a better gaming
experience would then need to buy more bandwidth--not permission to
use a given application.
The neutrality of such control would prevent the distortion in the
market for Internet applications. If carriers choose to block online games
in particular, this gives a market advantage to competing applications
that have not been blocked. But if broadband carriers only police
bandwidth, the result is an even-playing field. It may be that the expense
81. Also commonly referred to as "Massively Multiple Online Games," or MMOGs.
82. For an explanation of how a broadband carrier would do so, see, e.g., The Cisco
Content Delivery- Network Solution for the Enterprise, Cisco White Paper (Apr. 2002),
available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/publidcdso/neso/ienesv/ ome/ cdnen_wp.htm; See
also Cosine Communications., Digital Subscriber Lines and Managed Network-based
Services: A
Perfect-find Pro.itable--Jvlamage, White
Paper,
available at
http://cnscenter.future.co.kr/ resource/rsc-center/vendor-wp/cosine/dslwp. pdf.
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of more bandwidth leads people to choose different ways to spend their
money. But if so, that represents a market choice, not a choice dictated
by the filtering policy of the broadband carrier.

D. Borrowing from Well-Established Categories
One advantage of the proposal is that it relies on well-established
legal and technological criteria to achieve its consumer-welfare goals.
Respectively, it borrows from principles of harm requirements and nondiscrimination familiar to lawyers, along with a local/inter-network
distinction that is fundamental to Datacom networks.
1. The Harm Requirement

In the telephony context, the "foreign attachment" problem
discussed above was addressed by a "harm" rule; that is, a rule barring the
Bells from preventing attachment of equipment unless harm to the
network could be shown. Its origins are found in the Hush-a-Phone
case, where the FCC ordered Bell to allow telephone customers to attach
devices that "[do] not injure ... the public in its use of [Bell's] services,
or impair the operation of the telephone system. "83
In the broadband context, it is discrimination against certain
content and applications that is the major problem. But the practice of
requiring public harm to justify restrictions can be usefully employed.
2. LocaVInter-N etworking
Finally, on the technological side, the distinction between internetworking and local networking is very well established in the Datacom
industry. While the distinction is best reflected, and usually discussed, in
the context of the OSI network reference model (as the difference
between layer 2 and layer 3 networks), 84 it is in fact independent of OSI.
As a practical matter, different physical equipment and different
protocols run the different networks. In a given network, "switches" run
local networks, while "routers" collectively manage the layer 3 network.
Services can be offered at both levels-for example, VPN s and telephony
can be offered either as a layer. 2 service or as a layer 3 service.
In addition, other schema used to describe network layers embody
the same, fundamental, local/ inter-network distinction. For example,
83. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. AT&T, 22 FCC 112, 114 (1957). This led in turn to the
broader Carte.rfone decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), and finally Part 68, which adopted a
protective circuitry approach to protecting the telephone network, see 47 CFR §68 et seq.
84. C£ ANDREW TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 10-18 (4th ed. 2002).
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the TCP/IP network model maintains a distinction between the "link"
layer and the "network" layer. This is exactly the same distinction as the
layer 2/layer 3 distinction in the OSI model, and the local/inter-network
distinction more generally. Again, this is no surprise, because virtual
description simply reflects the physical network design. The existence
and pervasiveness of the local / inter-network distinction makes it a
natural dividing line for reasonable restrictions on use.

V. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED NETWORK NETRALITY REGIME
Before concluding, it is useful to consider some objections and
challenges to the proposed network neutrality regime. We consider (1)
whether it overly interferes with broadband carriers' ability to earn a
return on their infrastructure investment, (2) whether local restrictions
can be used to achieve the same problems as inter-network control, and
(3) whether the principle interferes with administration of Internet
addressing.

A. Return on Investment
First, does the neutrality principle restriction overly impinge on the
ability of broadband carriers to earn a return from their infrastructure
investments? While a full analysis of broadband economics is beyond the
scope of this proposal, we can nonetheless suggest that the neutrality
principle is unlikely to interfere with the special advantages that a carrier
gains from building its own infrastructure.
The simple answer is that investing in a local network infrastructure
creates its own rewards, as it creates particular advantages in the offering
of network services. We can see this clearly by considering the particular
example of Virtual Private Networks under the neutrality principle. A
broadband operator who owns the local infrastructure has a natural
advantage in offering local VPN services. The advantage comes from the
fact that they can offer service level guarantees that cannot be provided
on a shared network. Nothing in the neutrality principle would prevent a
broadband operator from being in the unique position to sell such
services.
But the principle would prevent operators from blocking use of
Internet VPNs - that is, VPNs that used the Internet to reaches sites
that no single local network can encompass. For example, a home user
on the East Coast will almost certainly need to use an Internet VPN to
connect to his business on the West Coast. In offering this service, a
broadband operator is in the exact position as any other Internet VPN
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provider. Restricting use of Internet VPNs should therefore not be
allowed, to preserve undistorted competition for this application.

B. Can Local Control Disrupt Application Markets?
Some might observe that the local and inter-network are
interdependent in certain ways. Won't broadband operators simply use
their control over the local network to achieve the same distortion of
application markets?
No rule can perfectly stamp out all undesirable behavior. The point
of the network neutrality principle is to make interference with the
application markets much harder. Without the ability to discriminate on
the basis of the origin of a packet or the application being used, the
broadband carrier is left with the far blunter tools oflocal restrictions.
It might be argued that the address resolution protocol (ARP) 85
could be used to achieve the same goals as IP-address filtering, since the
job of ARP on a typical network is to convert IP addresses into Ethernet
MAC addresses. But, in fact, a broadband carrier manipulating ARP
could only succeed in making his own users unreachable. The ARPcache only holds the information to match up local physical addresses
with local IP addresses. ARP has no idea how to stop a user from
reaching a specific IP address, other than making that user unreachable.
The example shows, in fact, the power of limiting a broadband carrier to
local control.

C. The Need to Administer IP
Finally, some might point out that broadband carriers need some
control over the Internet Protocol side of their network. They must, for
example, be able to allocate static and dynamic IP addresses, maintain
routing tables, and so on. Does the network neutrality principle interfere
with this?
The point of the neutrality principle is not to interfere with the
administration of the Internet Protocol side of a broadband carrier's
network. It is, rather, to prevent discrimination in that administration.
Since it is phrased as a non-discrimination principle, a negative inference
is that most aspects of IP administration can be conducted without
concern.
For example, the allocation and administration of IP

85.

Described in IETF RFC 826, availableathttp://www.ietf.org!rfclrfcl027.txt.

172

J ONTELECOMM &HIGHTECH L.

[Vol. 2

addressing should not pose any discrimination problems, so long as the
administration of such addresses is in an even-handed manner. 86

VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to make an initial case for a broadband
discrimination regime as an alternative to the structural remedy of open
access to achieve the goal of network neutrality. At this point, the
newness of the concept means much unavoidable vagueness as to its
operation. It is easier to point out examples of application discrimination
that seem unjustified than to elucidate a standard that nearly separates
the legitimate from the suspect. For example, there remains much work
to better define what the concepts of network neutrality and
discrimination would fully entail as a regulatory matter, or even as a
regulatory threat. Should neutrality be defined by IETF standards? The
intuitions of network theorists? Government definition? Any workable
regime designed to achieve network neutrality will need a more precise
conception of this and other matters. Nonetheless, the hope is that the
general framework described here might serve to begin the effort to
discourage the most blatant or thoughtless disfavoring of certain
application types through network design.

86. In today's environment, the scarcity ofIPv4 addresses does appear to justify a form of
discrimination: charging more for static addresses, than dynamic addresses. This forms a good
example of"permissible" discrimination.
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UPSTREAM I DOWNSTREAM BANDWIDTH RATIOS
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